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Abstract 
This essay lays out the historical and intellectual lineage of the idea behind 
the journal Feminist Dissent. As the “Rushdie Affair” was both the backdrop 
and the catalyst for a group such as Women Against Fundamentalism, the 
current conjuncture characterized by an exponential expansion of 
fundamentalism, neo-liberal austerity, rollback of the rights of women and 
sexual minorities, and racist control of borders and migration has 
necessitated a different kind of analysis, one that is absent from academic 
and popular discourse at the moment. This essay is an attempt to propose 
a new way of looking at the intersection of gender and fundamentalism, 
and underscores the importance of highlighting dissent as a crucial 
feminist strategy.  
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Feminist Dissent’s intellectual genesis lies in the activist and theoretical work 
produced by the group Women Against Fundamentalism (WAF), a feminist anti-
racist and anti-fundamentalist group that was established in London in 1989, as 
well as in the political, journalistic, creative and academic work pursued by 
individual members of our editorial collective, only some of whom have been 
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directly involved with WAF. WAF was formed in the wake of what has come to be 
known as “the Rushdie affair”, in which following the publication of Salman 
Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses, there emerged a transnational consolidation 
of religious fundamentalist forces from India to Bangladesh, from Britain to Iran 
and elsewhere. The fatwa issued by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini against Rushdie in 
February 1989 seeking the author’s death for the crime of blasphemy had been 
preceded by a ban of the book in India as it was perceived to be offending the 
faith of its Muslim minorities, and by demonstrations in Bradford, London and 
elsewhere in the UK. The book was publicly burnt and demands of death for 
Rushdie were made vociferously in retaliation for what was perceived as an insult 
to Muslims everywhere. 
In defence of Rushdie’s right to write, members of WAF asserted their own right 
to speak for themselves, to gender equality within communities, to diversity in 
religious practice and interpretation, to syncretism over purity, and to the right 
to question religious authority. For the Rushdie affair had brought to the fore an 
array of so-called community leaders, almost all male and many with dubious 
pasts in the Indian subcontinent, who used the moment to carve out a radical 
presence within the public sphere in Britain. They posed as representatives of 
minority immigrant communities, Britain’s racialised others who were under 
attack in Thatcher’s Britain. Indeed, some of the mainstream media coverage of 
the anti-Rushdie demonstrations portrayed the protestors as barbaric while 
some others likened them to Nazis, even as the National Front launched its own 
racist and xenophobic attacks on Asian communities.1  
 As South Asian fundamentalist community leaders came to dominate the 
public terrain and accrued legitimacy as ‘representatives’ of their communities, 
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feminist activists saw a different power situation emerging, caught as they were 
between British racism and their own communities’ social conservatism and 
growing fundamentalism. Many of the male voices to emerge in the wake of the 
Rushdie affair belonged to those who practiced profound gender conservatism, 
and whose idea of a pure culture and religion untarnished by the so-called ‘West’ 
while living in it was centrally organized around the idea of women as bearers of 
tradition. Those women who did not conform to their conservative vision were 
ostracized, demonised, and even killed. Moreover, these dominant voices, that 
also included second-generation Asian men who had participated in anti-racist 
movements, left no space to question or to dissent from the sexual norms and 
mores that governed these right-wing religious political mobilisations that were 
now curiously coalescing with seemingly progressive anti-racist positions, united 
in their understanding of women as objects of protection. 
 The founding of WAF was premised on the understanding that the form of 
gender politics that was laid bare during the Rushdie affair was not unique to 
Muslim communities, and that WAF’s work had to focus on fundamentalism as a 
rising powerful force within all religions.2 For at the same time, a similar 
consolidation of fundamentalist tendencies was gaining ground globally. In the 
United States of America, a resurgent Christian fundamentalism focused 
attention on the teaching of evolution in schools and consolidated its assault on 
gay and lesbian movements, women’s right to abortion, and other issues that 
were becoming central to the ‘culture wars’ of the ‘80s and ‘90s, with the close 
association of the Christian Coalition, Moral Majority and other groups with the 
Republican Party. The Christian right was also perpetrating attacks on 
reproductive rights in Ireland and elsewhere, while Hindu fundamentalism’s rise 
led to its social and political consolidation in India from the late 1980s via the 
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propagation of a vision of retrograde womanhood in the service of Hindu 
nationalism. There the renewed popularisation of the image of ‘bharat mata’, or 
the Indian nation as woman, led to a reinforcement of the idea that Hindu women 
need to be protected from rapacious Muslim ‘outsiders’ (Sarkar, 2001; 
Mazumdar, 1992). The Hindu supremacist mobilization that took place from the 
late 1980s onwards for the first saw time included substantial participation by 
Hindu women as activists for the cause of the Hindu nation (Sarkar and Butalia, 
1993). 
 Thus, WAF defined religious fundamentalism as a modern political movement 
and ideology seeking to consolidate power either within or in opposition to the 
state. In this, WAF made a crucial distinction between religious fundamentalism 
and religious observance, which it saw as a matter of personal choice. From its 
perspective, individuals have every right to follow any religious faith of their 
choice, or not to have faith at all, as long as their faith does not impinge on a 
gender just public space. On this view, it is secularism that offers the strongest 
guarantee of equality, of justice, and of equal access to the public, while leaving 
space for individual religious belief and unbelief. 
 
Two and a half decades later… 
Two and a half decades after WAF was first formed, we launch Feminist Dissent. 
The publication of the journal comes at a time when fundamentalism has spread 
its tentacles even deeper into our social and political lives and spaces. The impact 
of fundamentalism is being felt at a scale and in areas not previously known, such 
as the rise in Buddhist militancy in Burma, Sri Lanka and Thailand.3 In fact, what 
Varma, Dhaliwal, and Nagarajan. Feminist Dissent 2016 (1), pp. 1-32 
 
5 
 
has been marked in recent decades has been the coming together and 
networking of cross-border and transnational religious, including fundamentalist, 
forces. The Sri Lankan Bodu Bala Sena’s visit to Thailand and Burma in March 2014 
to discuss strategy towards Muslim minorities, the Nigerian super churches’ 
expansion into Sierra Leone having used the outbreak of Ebola as an entry point, 
and the sharing of tactics, inspiration, training and weapons between Islamist 
groups and the influence of Christian fundamentalist networks in African 
countries is indicative that fundamentalism is well on the rise globally. The 
ongoing murders of atheists and rationalists in Bangladesh, and the spectacular 
terror attack on an upscale restaurant in the country’s capital city Dhaka on 1st 
July 2016 in which about twenty six people were brutally killed, seem to be the 
handiwork of both local and transnational Islamist organisations, such as the 
terror outfit Aquis, the South-Asia Al-Qaeda affiliate, based in Pakistan (Ahmed, 
2016).  
 On a different ideological and political level, the Vatican exploits its status as 
a state to influence issues concerning women’s rights and the rights of sexual 
minorities. It works through local, national and transnational agents, both 
through the state and through civil society. We saw at CEDAW (the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women) the Vatican’s ability to work in alliances when need be, especially 
when it came to curtailing reproductive rights.4 Our argument is against 
the view then that fundamentalists are just mavericks, alienated from 
society, and general misfits. The case of how the Vatican furthers a 
fundamentalist agenda directly antithetical to women’s rights shows how 
fundamentalists clearly work in and through alliances. At the treaty level, 
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the Vatican, together with some Catholic majority countries such as Poland and 
Ireland, pushed for (but failed) to get language around God, Jesus Christ or 
Europe’s ‘Christian heritage’ in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
(2004). The Vatican also joined with a core group of Islamic states to oppose the 
proposals of the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice during the treaty 
negotiations leading to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(1999) (Beldont and Martinez, 1999). After all, few delegations were willing to 
expend political capital on this issue and it is unlikely there would have been any 
integration of a gender perspective in the Rome Statute at all without the actions 
of the Women’s Caucus.  
 This alliance building is most notable in recent struggles over the Commission 
on the Status of Women. Set up to review and push for implementation of the 
Beijing Platform for Action for Equality, Development and Peace (1995) and 
advance women’s rights, in 2012, delegates could not even agree on a final 
communiqué as a result of a cross regional alliance including the Vatican, Iran, 
Syria and Russia which is not only blocking progress but making it difficult to even 
cling on to the gains so far. Sticking points include mention of women’s sexual 
and reproductive rights, femicide, intimate partner violence, violence against 
women human rights defenders, violence against women based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity and early and forced marriage. Indeed, proposals 
for a conference twenty years on from the 1995 Fourth World Conference in 
Beijing met strenuous opposition from women’s rights groups and supportive 
governments precisely because of the likelihood of it leading to a rollback rather 
than progression in agreements on women’s rights at the international stage. 
Other recent developments – such as convictions of women for procuring their 
own abortions in countries including Argentina, Northern Ireland and Papua New 
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Guinea - have been the result of an alignment of fundamentalist mobilisations 
and nation states. 
 As shown by the most recent Freedom of Thought Report (IHEU, 2015), the 
freedom to dissent from religion and faith altogether seems to be shrinking in 
many contexts, whether this is as a result of fear of conviction for apostasy, death 
threats and assassinations by non-state actors, or societal pressure to be 
religious. So the numbers fleeing persecution because of religion, belief or non-
belief are increasing while borders are closing and international obligations 
towards refugees and asylum seekers are, in practice, being rescinded.5 
 Many states have taken approaches in respect to fundamentalist groups that 
are disproportionately militarised, violate human rights and fall discriminatorily 
on one community.6 The discourse in European states around refugees and 
migrants within or at their borders is laced with fears of infiltration by ad-Dawlah 
al-Islāmiyah (commonly known as Islamic State) fighters and of ‘being swamped’ 
by large numbers of Muslims, to the extent that some politicians in “Fortress 
Europe” have resorted to exploiting the threatening idea of “Eurabia”, the image 
of a Europe swamped by “Arab” migrants (Ferguson, 2004). The recent victory of 
the Brexit referendum in the UK has further exacerbated anti-immigrant 
sentiment and has unleashed racism and xenophobia on a large scale (Khaleeli, 
2016). 
 
Disturbing alliances 
The consolidation of fundamentalism globally at the same time as there is 
increasing control of borders and migration, often along race and class lines, and 
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of a worldwide financial crisis that spurred a wave of austerity measures across 
the globe, has exposed a deep chasm in progressives’ thinking about gender and 
race, together, as deeply articulated and intersectional, blurring the lines 
between anti-imperialism and a defence of minority authoritarianism (Tax, 2013). 
Sukhwant Dhaliwal and Nira Yuval-Davis (2013) describe the ‘contradictory 
pressures’ that WAF historically faced, and that anti-fundamentalist and anti-
racist feminists everywhere have to confront today. They write: ‘on the one hand 
(it/they) is/are faced with a growing majoritarian politics of belonging that is 
exclusionary and often anti-Muslim, and draws on either civilizational or Christian 
fundamentalist discourses. On the other hand, it is confronted by an undercutting 
of secular and other emancipatory movements by fundamentalist absolutist and 
authoritarian political projects in all religions. What’s more, these latter projects 
are also connected to a growing identity politics among some minorities 
(especially but not only Muslims) that often utilize human rights and anti-
imperialist discourses. All of this is taking place within a local and global crisis of 
neoliberal political economy and a securitarian “war on terrorism”’ (8). 
 In taking such a complex stand, feminists struggling for secular public spaces 
have often been accused of fuelling racism and imperialism, and of being 
‘western’, deracinated secularists (Oza, 2011; Kumar, 2014). These are 
accusations that continue to be levelled against activists, particularly women, 
who fight against fundamentalism and for the realisation of rights. Indeed, the 
voices of activists fighting against fundamentalist forces and state actions, often 
at the same time, continue to be marginalised from public discussion. Debate, 
particularly around violent extremism, often follows simplistic lines of being for 
human rights/ against racist policies, practices and discourse or for security and 
protection of civilians.  This journal aims to redress this imbalance, providing 
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space for discussion of gender and fundamentalism, including competing 
viewpoints, and highlighting the voices of activists and showcasing new research 
initiatives. 
 Such attacks on secular feminists underscore a profoundly disturbing 
emergence of contradictory alliances of politics and principles. For many on the 
Left, particularly in the global North, religious fundamentalists seem to be 
prosecuting a heroic anti-imperial struggle against the imperialist power of 
countries such as the US, UK and France.  Further faced with unprecedented cuts 
in the social budget and a brutally enforced austerity regime on the domestic 
front, many in the Left have come to see religious fundamentalism as the lone 
force in the world that seems to be able to challenge the unilateral power of the 
imperial countries.7 For their part, fundamentalists have tended to exploit anti-
imperialist traditions to present themselves as radical anti-Western anti-
imperialists. Groups like Stop the War Coalition and the Respect Party in the UK 
have allied with fundamentalists to forge what they see as an anti-racist and anti-
imperialist agenda. What we want to underscore is that in doing so, a critique of 
fundamentalism and authoritarian communal and patriarchal practices, including 
and particularly of non-state actors, has been neglected in the name of culture, 
tradition and ‘respect’ for difference. 
 The unprecedented and catastrophic series of events, known as the ‘war on 
terror’, unleashed by the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in September 
11, 2001 was followed by a US and UK-led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, a 
political, military and economic move that drastically altered pre-existing 
international relations across the board and unleashed an unprecedented 
escalation of jihadi violence. For a vast majority of the international Left, the war 
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on Iraq and Afghanistan was a form of “new imperialism” (Harvey, 2003), a new 
stage of the expropriation of the world’s resources via military might, while the 
dramatic rise of violent extremism was a form of ‘blowback’.8 The rhetoric of 
human rights and the fight against terrorism, for the Left, was a fig leaf for the 
West’s neo-colonial greed. 
 Since the US-UK led invasion of Iraq and the ‘war on terror’, there has been a 
significant resurgence of interest in the power of western states. Academic 
responses to these issues have, on the whole, tended to highlight the 
instrumentalisation of rights-based frameworks, the hypocrisy of nation states, 
and a critique of the civilizational, imperialist and racist presumptions at the heart 
of these developments. However, it is curious that little has been said by anti-
racist and feminist academics on fundamentalism. Prominent feminist theorists 
seem to have been significantly moved by the ‘war on terror’, but they have 
turned away from secularism and validated religious political formations. They 
seem more fascinated by women’s participation in religious political 
mobilisations and immersion in religious identity politics than the impact of 
fundamentalism on women and sexual minorities (see, for instance, Aune et al, 
2008; Brown, 2008; Butler, 2008; Braidotti, 2008; Bracke, 2008; Contractor, 2012; 
Fadil, 2011; Mahmood, 2005; Razack, 2005). Indeed we are still very far from 
Karima Bennoune’s (2008) carefully framed argument that we need a 
simultaneous critique of state torture and a much needed left, anti-racist, 
feminist and civil liberties critique of the perpetrators of terror. 
Another problematic that is not that dissimilar to the Bush-Blair years and 
that has proved divisive among the international Left is the role of international 
intervention (Achcar, 2015; Prashad, 2016).9 Within days of the Paris attacks of 
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November 2015, France began bombing Syria while Europe tightened its borders 
against Syrians, many of whom are fleeing the death game between religious 
absolutist Islamic State militants and an authoritarian Assad regime. A repetitive 
polarization in the debate between a focus on the duplicitous politicians involved 
in war mongering and the left critique of any form of state intervention has 
highlighted the sorts of limited vision and political possibility that has been the 
source of frustration for the members of Feminist Dissent editorial collective.  
 A simplistic anti-imperialist argument that shifts the attention away from a 
systematic analysis of fundamentalist movements to an emphasis on the role that 
western governments have played in exacerbating Islamist recruitment or 
financial support needs to be nuanced. The material reality of racism does mean 
that one has to simultaneously fight for the right to talk about Islamism and also 
highlight the racist rhetoric of ‘fortress Europe’. The “race card” and the question 
of international intervention align within the recurring recourse to patriotic and 
nationalist discourses that place pressure to declare one’s allegiance to the 
nation state without any sense that so called “British” values or “French” values 
are not the preserve of nation states or of nationalist projects. The idea of 
‘another Europe’ suggests that these must be values linked to human rights 
frameworks, and anti-discrimination values that have been fought for and shaped 
by an array of civil society mobilisations and actors across the global South and 
equally by minorities in Britain and across Europe. 
 In part this retreat from criticism of religious fundamentalism is the 
consequence of what Chetan Bhatt (1999) has referred to as the ‘cultural 
episteme’ and is a reproduction of an earlier tendency to treat the ethnic minority 
subject as particularly fragile and as victim. The proliferation of academic and 
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journalistic work on ‘Islamophobia’ as the leading issue of our times, and 
published by leading leftwing presses such as Haymarket and Verso, provides 
instances of this (Kumar, 2012; Kundnani, 2015). Muslim men and women 
challenging fundamentalism are placed in the double bind of being burdened by 
right wing assimilationist pressures to challenge fundamentalism within their 
communities and a simultaneous criticism by left wing forces for pandering to 
state agendas and imperialism when they do so. 
 
The Culture Wars 
The Left liberal defence of culture, religion and tradition, seen especially in its 
ambivalent response to attacks on freedom of expression in favour of a politics 
of hurt sentiments of religious minorities, as exemplified most recently in the 
responses to the Charlie Hebdo murders but going as far back as the Rushdie 
affair, has of course been conversely matched by the resurgent ‘clash of 
civilisations’ thesis popularised by the American political scientist Samuel 
Huntington (1996) and the rhetoric and policies of politicians of the West who 
feed into and propagate the language of ‘Western ideals and values’ as universal 
values that are fundamentally at odds with Muslim culture. In fact, the then US 
President George Bush used distinctively Christian imagery to characterise the 
invasion of Afghanistan as a ‘crusade’ and that he was on a God-given mission to 
save the world.10 Thus the so-called ‘war on terror’ was deemed to be the 
outcome of an irreconcilable clash of civilisations, in which the West’s superior 
material and ideological position would eventually vanquish the barbaric and 
backward people that the invasions were targeting. It exploited the image of the 
helpless Afghan women needing protection, as well as contrasted the 
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bureaucratised, sanitised and protective forms of masculinity of the international 
technocrats and military forces with the brutal, repressive and ‘barbaric’ 
masculinity of Taliban fighters.  
 The protection of human rights, particularly those of women and lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, trans and intersex (lgbti) people has also been used in political rhetoric 
justifying actions ranging from military invasions to increased surveillance on 
communities. The ways in which the empowered, female (Jewish) Israeli soldier 
is used as a counterpart to the helpless, veiled (Muslim) Palestinian woman or 
the phenomenon of ‘pink washing’ are also different manifestations of this 
instrumentalisation of human rights discourses. There is of course often justified 
scepticism as to whether concern for human rights is really the reason for military 
or diplomatic intervention, with sceptics highlighting human rights violations 
committed by countries such as the UK and USA themselves, and pointing to the 
inconsistency in their treatment of different countries (see Prashad, cited above). 
 In many cases, these dynamics are exacerbated by the fact that the list of 
invasions of countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia by Western powers 
seems ever-expanding, or as policies such as economic sanctions have been 
levied by the international community on supposedly rogue regimes that then 
wreak havoc on their own populations. The US-led invasion of Iraq and 
Afghanistan had a devastating impact on the region, one that is still reverberating 
with ongoing consequences in terms of the numbers of deaths, disability, loss of 
livelihoods, destruction of economic development and the erosion of human 
rights. The recent release of the Chilcot Report/Iraq Inquiry in July 2016 passed a 
damning verdict on the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s decision to attack 
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Iraq by deliberately exaggerating the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction.11  
 It is also symptomatic of global power politics that the withholding of aid or 
military arms and other assistance because of concerns regarding human rights 
violations are often spun by conservative anti-imperialists as punishment for 
holding on to ‘traditional values’ and part of a Western agenda to ‘make everyone 
like them.’ This is exemplified in the visit of Barack Obama, President of the USA, 
to Senegal in 2013. Against a backdrop of increasingly contentious and polarised 
global debates on the human rights of lgbti people and US foreign policy, 
President Macky Sall of Senegal, in a move hailed by the national media, talked 
about the need for countries to not impose their values on others. He said: ‘We 
don’t ask Europeans to be polygamists. We like polygamy in our country but we 
can’t impose it in yours’ (Nossiter, 2013). 
 Such a solidification, reification and narrowing of culture and tradition as that 
unleashed by religious fundamentalism of all hues has to be juxtaposed with the 
influence of religious norms from the ‘outside’, as fundamentalist movements 
become increasingly transnational. So for example in northern Nigeria, while the 
culture of sexual relationships between unmarried couples was widespread and 
tolerated, the implementation of sharia law across northern states from 2000 
onwards has sought to constrain and re-shape gender relations and matters of 
sexuality. Many of the earlier customs are now seen as transgressive, with 
charges of zina (criminalising sex outside marriage) being levelled at so-called 
perpetrators as women’s sexuality is increasingly viewed as a source of 
immorality (Pereira, 2005). These social shifts are linked to the radicalisation of 
northern Nigerian Islam through its contact with zealous and fundamentalist 
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Islamic sects in other parts of the world from the 1970s onwards, leading to more 
puritanical and stricter interpretations that had previously been played down 
(Best, 2001). 
 
UK Context 
In the UK context – the place where Feminist Dissent is founded and based– many 
contemporary themes, paradoxes and positions still chime with the key moments 
of WAF’s formative years. The problems and paradoxes that were identified by 
WAF women within the context of an assimilationist Thatcherite government at 
home and resurgent religious political mobilisations across the globe were 
exacerbated by a New Labour government for whom religious organisations were 
a critical part of governance. Post 9/11 in particular, religious groups and religious 
identities became an important aspect of civil society mobilisations and counter 
narratives.  
 Thus, this twenty-first century is marked by what many of those involved with 
the Editorial Collective have referred to as ‘multifaithism’, a new religious 
settlement between states and populations. A multiculturalist practice based on 
the undemocratic negotiations of the state with an unelected layer of 
“community leaders” (often religious men) has bolstered the power of ethnic 
minority religious leaderships in the UK over a number of decades. The 
multiculturalist settlement slid into multifaithism whereby religion became the 
primary signifier of difference and therefore of the state’s invocation of strategies 
for diversity management (Dhaliwal and Yuval Davis, 2013).  
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 Multifaithism has had the effect of extending, privileging and 
institutionalising religion in relation to state relations with individuals, 
communities and civil society. This institutionalisation of religion within both 
politics and public policy that began with the election of New Labour in 1997 
persisted in their experiment with religious communitarianism even though it 
contradicted the party’s own social democratic commitment to equality and non-
discrimination, and even though religious communitarianism directly 
contradicted Labour’s post-2001 drive on community cohesion and preventing 
violent extremism. The growing significance of religion for government and for 
civil society was continued under first the Conservative- Liberal Democrat 
Coalition and then the Conservative Party. These tendencies are also reflected in 
the trajectories and contemporary contexts of other countries, especially those 
with colonial histories.  
In the UK, there has never been a full separation of religion and state, and 
citizenship demands have been vented in the form of parity demands by minority 
religious groups as far back as the 1960s. Demands for the recognition of religious 
accommodation have also been fuelled by the legislative recognition of some 
religions as ‘ethnic groups’ – notably Sikhs and Jews under the Race Relations Act 
1976. Prominent liberal political theorists such as Tariq Modood and Bhikhu 
Parekh continue to align with leaders of fundamentalist bodies (such as Iqbal 
Sacranie of the Jamaat-e-Islami led Muslim Council of Britain) to campaign 
through public inquiries like the Woolf Commission for the recognition of religion 
as a public good and a role for religion in public life. At the same time, sociology 
of religion scholars, the National Secular Society and the British Humanist 
Association are suggesting that religious identification and practice are on the 
decline while the view that religion should not play a significant role in the public 
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sphere – in welfare services, political life and the state – is gathering pace (Brown, 
2016; Voas and Crockett, 2005; Voas, 2013; Woodhead, 2016). Such a 
contradiction poses significant questions for this journal on why religion is 
nonetheless an increasing aspect of the structure of modern political and public 
life and of state governance. There also seems to be significant confusion about 
the definition and practice of what is referred to as ‘secular’ and ‘secularism’ and 
a frequent conflation of secular with the term ‘atheist’. This has been apparent 
at our own seminar series where speakers have relied on diverse understandings 
of secularism.12 Feminist Dissent will grapple with these tensions and debates 
about what constitutes secularism and what specifically this means for gender 
norms and relations, sexuality, the ability to secure women’s and girls’ rights, for 
the feminist subject, and for developments in feminist theory. 
 What we have also seen emerge quite centrally are the majoritarian 
dimensions of electoral politics, as in Egypt and India, among other countries. 
Indeed, both Tony Blair and David Cameron have relied on support from religious 
networks for the reinvention of their respective political parties. For Blair these 
religious networks were concentrated on minority religious groups (Sikhs, Hindus 
and Muslims) while for Cameron and the more extremist wing of the Tory Party, 
Christian Evangelical networks have been an additional source of political 
opportunity (Brown, 2010; Cook, 2010; Doward, 2010). Many of these religious 
networks contain fundamentalist lobbies with very specific demands: under Blair 
a central focus was the push for central state funding for ethnic minority religious 
schools and the proliferation of particular versions of their religions through 
consultative mechanisms; under Cameron, a pro-life and anti-reproductive rights 
lobby gained a voice at the centre of government. While the Conservative Party’s 
austerity agenda has led to a significant reduction in the number of specialist 
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feminist services, Christian fundamentalism has been pushing through all manner 
of government spaces to validate a new wave of groups that are seemingly 
innocuous counselling and welfare organisations but are funded by US Christian 
fundamentalist networks pushing an anti-abortion agenda (Imkaan, 2016; 
Manjoo, 2015; Walby, 2012). Christian fundamentalists have also been quick to 
mobilise to gain political power in post-Brexit Britain as can be seen in the rise of 
Andrea Leadsom  - the main Tory party challenger to Teresa May--who is part of 
a group called Christians in Parliament and organise Bible Study Groups. 
 Another recurring factor has been the widespread understanding of religion 
and religious institutions as essential sources of morality and as a form of social 
glue. This is in spite of increased information about diversity and dissent within 
religions, critique of religious morality, and the significant media attention to 
religious terrorism around the globe, from ethnic cleansing of Muslims and 
Christians by Hindu Right forces in India to the transnational Islamist terror 
networks right through to the bombing of abortion clinics by the Christian Right 
in the US. Moreover, this sense of religions as cohesive in a context of heightened 
panic about the ‘breakdown of society’ is closely tied to and strengthened by yet 
another, and potentially most important, factor since the turn of the century – 
the realisation that state engagement with religious organisations can facilitate 
(rather than impede or challenge) the proliferation of neo-liberalism because, 
through shared political interests, relations between state and religious 
organisations can actually extend the influence of the state and particularly its 
soft policing function while simultaneously helping to contain or reduce its 
pastoral and welfare obligations. This insight began with Tony Blair’s reinvention 
of communitarianism towards neo-liberal ends (Rose, 2001) and has continued 
with Cameron’s Big Society. The notion of Big Society has manipulated the 
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language of left politics to discursively embellish a return to voluntarism and the 
retraction of the state by getting “community” to “voluntarily” mop up the fallout 
of a neo-liberal retraction of the state in exchange for de-regulation (Coote, 
2010). Religious organisations have been quick to jockey for attention under the 
Big Society agenda and to make pro-active use of the extension of free schools 
and other state policies.13 
 Very few academics have critiqued this process despite a burgeoning ‘faiths 
literature’ in the UK. Even fewer have really grappled with the way that 
fundamentalist organisations have worked through these spaces in order to gain 
legitimacy and institute new gendered norms. The UK faiths literature is largely a 
functionalist argument about the capacity and positive impact of religious 
partners in civil society initiatives. Moreover, it projects religious groups as 
important carriers of social capital and providers of welfare support, and also 
projects religion as ‘cohesive’, and ‘faith communities’ as central players in 
tackling ‘radicalisation’ (for instance Beaumont, 2009; Blond, 2010; Bretherton, 
2010; Chapman 2012, Dinham, Furbey & Lowndes 2009, Dinham, 2009; Dinham 
et al, 2006; Farnell, 2001; Glasman 2008 and 2010; Jawad, 2012 to name just a 
few). Any critical tendencies within this expansive body of knowledge are limited 
to accusations that the state is instrumentalising religious belief for its own gains. 
Very little has been said about the specific implications for women, for sexual and 
racialized minorities of the new multifaithism and /or the ways in which 
fundamentalist projects have made proactive use of these multiple spaces.14  
Most recently, reactions to the government’s Prevent agenda have oscillated 
between left / anti-racist critiques that focus on the power of the state and its 
securitarian agenda that not only extends the authoritarian arm of the state but 
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also mobilises concerns about terrorism towards anti-immigration policies and 
racist sentiments [see Kundnani, 2007; McGhee, 2010] at the cost of discussing 
and debating fundamentalist recruitment within the UK. Critical questions 
remain unanswered about the role of intelligence when the extended reach of 
the state is not able to prevent attacks like the one in London on 7/7, in Paris in 
2015 and in Brussels in 2016, from taking place. Whose role is it to keep people 
safe if it isn’t the role of the state, and if it is the role of the state then what does 
a state-supported anti-fundamentalist agenda look like?  
 On the same day as the Paris attacks in November 2015, the Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi, who had played a controversial role in the Gujarat riots 
of 2002 in which over 2,000 Mulsims were killed under his watch as Chief Minister 
of the state, and who had been denied a visa by the UK until then, was greeted 
by large crowds at a packed Wembley Stadium event organized and financed by 
Indians living in the UK, including a number of elected Labour party politicians of 
Indian origin. The previous day, Modi had been subjected to a large 
demonstration during his visit to Downing Street. Those two days raised a 
number of questions that highlight some of the issues with which this journal 
seeks to contend. The Wembley event reflected popular appeal for a 
fundamentalist political project, its entanglements with nationalist sentiment 
and diaspora politics. The diverse organisations represented at the anti-Modi 
rally reflected the diverse interests that may, at various points, oppose 
fundamentalist politics, including other fundamentalists. But the way in which 
Sikh fundamentalists utilized these spaces in particular, standing both inside state 
discussions with Modi and on the frontline of the anti-Modi demonstration 
reflects both the diverse character of fundamentalist political projects and their 
sophisticated utilization of a range of different spaces. Moreover, the presence 
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of Sikh fundamentalists at the anti-Modi rally raised a number of additional 
concerns about political alliances and re-emphasised the concern about diasporic 
financing for fundamentalist politics in South Asia. The fact that media attention 
to Modi’s visit was usurped by a terrorist attack in Paris, which Modi himself 
utilized to lay claim to a language of universal opposition to terrorism, throws 
together a huge number of questions about the links between fundamentalism 
and violence, the location of power, the language of fundamentalism and anti-
fundamentalism, as well as the ongoing utility of anti-Muslim racism, anti-
immigrant sentiment and nationalism. 
 
Why Feminist Dissent? 
We believe that the task of Feminist Dissent is now more challenging than ever. 
Current events and trends that have been shaped and driven by shifts in religion, 
political identities and geopolitics over the past decades globally signal a sea-
change from the earlier period of decolonization in Africa and Asia when a vision 
committed to a secular, socialist and internationalist global society was 
articulated, as in the concept of tricontinentalism, or in the anti-racist counter-
culture energies of the 1960s and 1970s. In academia, postcolonial and 
postmodernist strands of critical inquiry and the dominance of cultural relativism 
whose critique of the Enlightenment as a racist and imperialist project, and a 
concomitant valorisation of the popular and the subaltern has led, ironically, to a 
retreat from a critique of religious fundamentalism and patriarchy. While we take 
on board the insights gained from materialist postcolonial theory that the 18th 
century Enlightenment was indeed instrumentalised in the hands of slave-owners 
and colonisers to justify European superiority, we draw inspiration from anti-
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colonial struggles that were fought by peoples throughout Asia and Africa in 
order to wrest concepts of freedom, liberty, rule of law, rights, secularism, etc. 
from the ‘West’. 
 Thus, twenty-five years since the Rushdie Affair, the situation seems both 
more complex yet also more straightforward.  Firstly, the interrelation between 
gender and fundamentalism needs to be viewed in the context of societal and 
global shifts over the last two and a half decades that include the retreat of the 
state globally from the social sector, growing atomisation caused by migration to 
cities and displacement from the countryside, as well as the constant state of war 
over terror and resources. Indeed, the failure of the state to provide social 
security has contributed to the increasing importance of non-state actors, 
including those organised around faith lines, to fill the gap within social well 
being. Meanwhile, women often join religious extremist forces for similar reasons 
as men, as well as a way to gain some power, freedom and access to religious 
knowledge denied to them by more mainstream religious and cultural mores 
(Ladbury, 2015).15 There is also an ironic link to situations where, for example, 
the abductions in northern Nigeria in recent years bear more similarity to 
abductions by the Lord’s Resistance Army, a rebel and cult group operating in 
northern Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, than to other violent fundamentalist movements motivated 
by Islam. Furthermore, religion, along with other identity markers such as 
ethnicity and occupational groups, has been instrumentalised in conflict to 
mobilise communities to ‘their’ cause. Indeed, these factors have been playing 
an increasingly greater role in conflicts and violence than before, linked to shifts 
in the politicisation of these identities and with the complicity and 
encouragement of state and non-state actors. Forms of Islamic fundamentalism 
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have become almost synonymous with fundamentalism itself for many politicians 
and commentators. Yet entire Muslim communities are implicated in this and 
such a narrative fails to see the commonalities with other forms of religious 
fundamentalism, often not framed as fundamentalism or seen as essentially 
different. It also fails to take a global perspective. 
 We find that in contrast to dominant academic and international NGO-driven 
work, progressive movements on the ground often have stronger analyses of 
fundamentalism, and seek to combat its influence and impact, as well as seek to 
highlight progressive interpretations of religion and engender changes in 
religious, state and cultural institutions (Zia, 2011). After all, feminist activists, 
whether in India or Nigeria or Turkey, or in Latin American countries, in their 
activism have historically embraced ideas of freedom, secularism and rights and 
have a much more nuanced understanding and navigation of the terrain of 
colonialism, racism and rights than often seen in the West. They ask the question: 
are we to cede all of these ideas to Western imperialism? We argue that the 
history of anti-colonial struggles in fact has been precisely that—to wrench these 
concepts from their European moorings and to re-signify them for anti-colonialist 
and progressive aims. As such, a key aim of Feminist Dissent is to query the gap 
between academic and activist work, and to ask crucial questions about why such 
a gap exists. 
 We call it Feminist Dissent because as feminists we dissent both from the 
fundamentalist and neo-liberal political forces seeking to control our worlds 
today, but also from large strands within dominant theory and activism, 
especially as institutionalised in the Western academy, that have not provided 
consistent secular and progressive responses to ongoing global economic and 
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political crises that include a resurgent fundamentalism and attacks on a secular 
feminist public sphere.  
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Notes 
1 For an account, twenty years later, of the Rushdie affair and WAF’s founding, 
see Rahila Gupta (2016). See also Sukhwant Dhaliwal and Nira Yuval-Davis (2013). 
In it, many of the founders of WAF reflect on the moment of WAF’s founding and 
its relevance twenty-five years later.  
2 For an excellent collection of essays on the resurgence of religious-based 
identity movements and its impact on gender issues, see Valentine Moghdam 
(1994).  
3 The killing and displacement of the Rohingya Muslim minority in 
Burma/Myanmar, as well as the attacks against Christians and Muslims in Sri 
Lanka, are believed to be carried out by the Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power 
Force). It has also demanded laws to protect Buddhism and its declaration as a 
state religion in Thailand. 
4 See WAF Journal No. 7, 1995, which had a specific focus on reproductive rights 
at the Beijing Conference. See http://womenagainstfundamentalism.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/waf7.pdf 
5 See Amnesty International’s report entitled The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: 
Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Border 
(London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2014) for a detailed account of the violations 
of human rights taking place on Europe’s borders, including the deaths of 
thousands. 
http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports/EUR_050012014__Fortress_E
urope_complete_web_EN.pdf 
6 For example, international human rights organisations and local activists have 
documented a number of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, 
torture, sexual violence and long-term detention without charge, committed by 
the Nigeria military (Amnesty International, 2015; Center for Civilians in Conflict, 
2015.) The controversial Prevent agenda in the UK as a tactic to prevent 
“radicalisation” of Muslim youth is also seen as an attempt by the British state to 
make surveillance of minority ethnic communities legitimate. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf See also the podcast of a workshop on 
Prevent organised by Feminist Dissent at the University of Warwick on 15 January 
2016: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qE_Ig3G7KxA In India, there has been 
a spate of “encounter” killings and extrajudicial internments for those suspected 
of terrorism, especially in areas such as Kashmir and those under Maoist 
influence. 
7 The brutal murder of the cartoonists who ran the French satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 produced a deeply ambivalent response from the 
Left as well as from many liberals in the West, who saw the cartoonists as 
representatives of a secular West out of touch with the religious sentiments of 
France’s disempowered and vulnerable Muslim population. The writer Rachel 
Kushner decried Charlie Hebdo’s “cultural intolerance” and its promotion of “a 
forced secular view”. See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/nyregion/six-
pen-members-decline-gala-after-award-for-charlie-hebdo.html?_r=0 (accessed 
on 28 June 2016) 
8 “Blowback: Vijay Prashad on How Islamic State Grew Out of U.S. Invasion of 
Iraq, Destruction of Nation”, Democracy Now! August 25, 2014. 
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http://www.democracynow.org/2014/8/25/blowback_vijay_prashad_on_how_i
slamic_state (last accessed 6 July 2016) 
9 Other vocal Left intellectuals against intervention are Tariq Ali and Patrick 
Cockburn. For a response to Tariq Ali’s opposition to intervention in Syria, see the 
blogpost  https://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2015/11/30/response-
to-tareq-ali-2015-or-the-need-for-internationalist-solidarity/. For a response to 
Cockburn’s writing on Syria, see Gilbert Achcar (2015). 
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